Title
Perverse Incentives? Labor Market Regulation and Performance in the Public Sector
Date Issued
01 July 2019
Access level
metadata only access
Resource Type
journal article
Author(s)
Cozzubo A.
Georgia State University
Publisher(s)
Wiley Blackwell
Abstract
We test the link between labor market regulations and job performance in the public sector using a novel outcome variable, namely, the number of days it takes the postal service to return letters sent to nonexistent foreign addresses, a measure that we argue is an excellent proxy for job performance. We find a positive and statistically significant link between these two variables, regardless of the labor regulation measure employed, changes in specification, and even unlikely endogeneity considerations, which suggest that this finding may be causal.
Start page
271
End page
285
Volume
86
Issue
1
Language
English
OCDE Knowledge area
Economía, Negocios
Scopus EID
2-s2.0-85065204028
Source
Southern Economic Journal
ISSN of the container
00384038
Source funding
World Bank Group
Sponsor(s)
We are grateful to Arlette Beltr?n, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Joan Mart?nez, Andrei Shleifer, Luisa Zanforlin, and seminar participants at the University of Ottawa and the World Bank for comments and suggestions. The standard disclaimer applies.
Sources of information:
Directorio de Producción Científica
Scopus