Title
Seasoned equity crowdfunded offerings
Date Issued
01 January 2021
Access level
open access
Resource Type
journal article
Author(s)
University of Essex
Publisher(s)
Elsevier B.V.
Abstract
This paper conjectures that, just as SEO (seasoned equity offering) firms are likely to face fewer information asymmetry problems relative to IPO firms, the same applies to SECO relative to initial ECF (equity crowdfunding) campaign firms. This is mainly due to new information at a SECO - such as pre-money valuation gains – that reduces adverse selection problems. Using a sample of 709 UK ECF firms conducting a first SECO campaign over the 2011–2018 period, the probit results suggest that annualised valuation gains between the initial and SECO campaigns increases the probability of having a successful first SECO campaign but the equity offered lowers this probability. First SECO success is also related to different platform shareholder structures. The results show that the nominee model and coinvestment model dominate the direct model in terms of the probability of conducting a successful first SECO campaign. This is likely linked to reduced adverse selection and moral hazard problems stemming from no separation between ownership and control and enhanced due diligence and monitoring capabilities.
Language
English
OCDE Knowledge area
Negocios, Administración
Scopus EID
2-s2.0-85100601042
Source
Journal of Corporate Finance
ISSN of the container
09291199
Sponsor(s)
Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Developments in Alternative Finance Conference at the University of Birmingham, June 2019, EFMA Conference at the University of the Azores, June 2019, and BLG-EFiC Conference on Recent Developments in Crowdfunding Conference at the University of Essex, June 2018, the Infiniti Conference in Poznan, June 2018. We would particularly like to thank the Birmingham discussant Gianfranco Gianfrate and two anonymous referees for their insightful comments that substantially improved the overall structure of our paper. We also thank Douglas Cumming, Lars Hornuf and Ross Brown for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of the paper. The authors gratefully acknowledge Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) funding under grant number ES/L011859/1.
Sources of information: Directorio de Producción Científica Scopus