Title
Sacrificing justice for efficiency?: Examining premature dismissal rates in peruvian corruption cases
Date Issued
01 January 2019
Access level
metadata only access
Resource Type
book part
Publisher(s)
Taylor and Francis
Abstract
The problem of corruption in Peru is endemic. Since 2000, four democratically elected presidents have been imprisoned or put under investigation for corruption. Even more alarming are survey findings that one out of four Peruvians admit to having bribed a public servant, and half of the population would vote for a local government candidate who might steal from the national budget so long as he or she invests in infrastructure. In an attempt to curb the problem of corruption, the justice system has stepped up through the creation of a specialized anticorruption subsystem to review the most complex corruption cases, as well as the reform of the Criminal Procedure Code, which replaced the old written inquisitorial system with an oral, less bureaucratic one based on adversarial models. While these reforms promised greater justice and efficiency in the judicial handling of corruption cases, this chapter argues that justice itself may have been sacrificed in pursuit of efficiency. In particular, this chapter explores how the new Criminal Procedure Code encourages the premature dismissal of corruption cases by the public prosecutor.
Start page
182
End page
197
Language
English
OCDE Knowledge area
Derecho
Scopus EID
2-s2.0-85082908176
Resource of which it is part
Criminal Legalities in the Global South: Cultural Dynamics, Political Tensions, and Institutional Practices
ISBN of the container
978-042986169-7
Sources of information: Directorio de Producción Científica Scopus