A basic proposal for the understanding of the juridical consequences of the law’s moral defects is elaborated on the basis of the debate between Alexy and Finnis in The American Journal of Jurisprudence (2013-2014), and The Cambridge Companion to Natural Law Jurisprudence (2017). The article is divided in two parts. In the first one, a synthesis is made between, on the one hand, the main coincidence between both approaches, and on the other, their basic discrepancies. In the second, an alternative proposal is elaborated. Thus, first, the pertinence of a dialogue between their arguments is justified. Second, it is defended that a proper understanding of the Alexian version of the Radbruch’s formula can adequately account for the juridical consequences of the law’s moral defects, but only if it is formulated from a semantic orbit which is analogue to the basic claims of Finnis. Thirdly, the author’s opinion on the subject is given.